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Abstract
The mere potential for one player to burn money prior to play has been shown in theory to
effective device to select this player’s most preferred outcome, e.g., in the battle-of-the-sexe
[J. Econ. Theory 48 (1989) 476, J. Econ. Theory 57 (1992) 36]. In this study we assess the beh
relevance of this theoretical claim. It is shown that its validity depends on whether the game is
in extensive or normal form. In extensive form games first movers benefit substantially from h
the opportunity to burn money in advance. The effect is much weaker in the normal form
However, in two control treatments first movers who can select between two related game
an advantage although standard forward induction arguments do not have any bite. These
suggest that we need to make further theoretical advances to understand the role of physica
and first-mover advantages in games.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: C72; C92
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As innocent as the “battle-of-the-sexes” (BoS) game shown in Table 1 may se
poses a challenge to game theorists as there is no obvious prediction about how
should play this game. After all, the game has three different Nash equilibria—
asymmetric ones in pure strategies,(P Y ) and(Y,P ), and one in mixed strategies in whic
each player playsY with probability 1/4 and earns an expected payoff of 3/4. To overcome
this indeterminacy without entering into the realm of equilibrium selection theory, g
theorists have suggested to look at slight variations of the basic game—variations t
supposedly more realistic and lead to a unique solution.1
• A first approach, that has been introduced by Farrell (1987), is to allow playe
engage in nonbinding pre-play communication. Here actual play of the BoS ga
preceded by one or more rounds in which players simultaneously make anno
ments regarding their intended play. Farrell shows that this game has a sym
equilibrium in which players coordinate more often than in the mixed equilibrium
the simple BoS game.
• A second approach involves giving one player, say the row player, an outside o
that gives her a certain payoff in case she decides not to play the game. Now s
the row player chooses to play the game nevertheless. Does this convey any in
tion that is carried forward into the ensuing subgame? Some authors have arg
does (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986). Because why should the row player enter in
BoS game if she were to expect a payoff lower than her outside option payoff?
the fact that the row player refuses to take the outside option tells the column
something about the row player’s intention in the BoS game to be played next, n
that she wants to earn a higher payoff than she would have earned by exercis
outside option. (Otherwise she could simply have taken it.) This principle is callefor-
ward induction.2 It signifies the idea that the intended play of an agent at the begin
of a subgame might be inferred from her play in earlier stages of the game. In the
at hand, an outside option payoff greater than 1 and smaller than 3 for the row
would be sufficient to ensure coordination on her preferred equilibrium(P,Y ).
• A third approach (van Damme, 1989, and Ben-Porath and Dekel, 1992), on




Y (ield) P (referred)
Row Y (ield) 0, 0 1, 3
player P(referred) 3, 1 0, 0
1 Equilibrium selection theory à la Harsanyi and Selten (1988) would select the mixed equilibrium.
2 Note that this principle corresponds to the notion ofstrategic stability in normal form games introduced bKohlberg and Mertens (1986).






























The extended game in which the row player may burn one payoff unit in the frist stage
Game to be played after the row player’s
decision not to burn money
Column player
Y P
Row Y 0, 0 1, 3
player P 3, 1 0, 0
Game to be played after the row player’s
decision to burn money
Column player
Y P
Row Y −1, 0 0, 3
player P 2, 1 −1, 0
to “burn” some money before the game is played. Suppose that the row player m
may not burn 1 “util” before the game begins. Then the actual game that is played
one shown in Table 2 where the right subgame is derived from the BoS game b
stracting one unit from the row player’s payoff in each of the four cells. Again one
apply some forward induction reasoning though it is this time a bit trickier: Sup
the row player decides to burn money. Then she must expect that(P,Y ) will be played
because the two other equilibria give her less than what she could have secured
self in the original game.3 Hence, if this is correctly understood by the column play
the row player can, by burning money, secure herself a payoff of 2. In the next s
reasoning, this implies that if she decides not to burn money she also must expe
(P,Y ) will be played (because both other equilibria give her less than what she
have secured for herself by burning money). Hence, the subgame perfect equil
based on forward induction is for the row player not to burn money followed by ch
ing P in both subgames and for the column player to chooseY in both subgames.
All three models are designed to put the original game in a context in which it bec
easier for players to coordinate. So one question is whether real people benefit from
contexts as much as fully rational players do. In other words, one might ask whethe
models help to predict actual behavior. Laboratory experiments seem ideally su
answer this questions. The available evidence on the success of forward induction is
With respect to the three theoretical approaches to resolving the BoS game the lit
provides us with the following findings.4
3 In the original game the row player’s expected payoff cannot drop below 3/4.
4 Further experimental evidence on forward induction can be found in Brandts and Holt (1992) who
data from several two-stage games with complete information. Their findings support the usefulness of
induction. Cooper et al. (1992) investigate a 2× coordination game with two Pareto-ranked equilibria and re
that a payoff-relevant outside option changes play in the direction predicted by forward induction. Van Hu
al. (1993) report the success of forward induction in a setup in which the right to participate in a coord
game is auctioned off prior to play. Brandts and Holt (1995) report—in the context of a BoS game with an
option for one of the players—that forward induction works well where it coincides with a simple domin
argument, but fails where dominance does not apply. Cachon and Camerer (1996) investigate a setup
subjects may pay a fee to participate in a coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. They report t
is consistent with forward induction. Finally, Balkenborg (1998) reports that in a simple game in extensiv
in 80% of all cases play resulted in the outcome predicted by backward induction whereas the outcome p
by forward induction was only rarely observed.





































per by• Cooper et al. (1989) provide experimental evidence on the role of pre-play co
nication in the BoS game. They investigate three different communication struc
one-way communication with one round of messages and two-way communic
with either one round or three rounds of messages concerning intended play
conclude that “[c]ommunication significantly increased the frequency of equilib
play” and that “[o]ne-way communication was most effective in resolving the co
nation problem” (p. 568). In particular, the frequency of ex post equilibrium play
from 48% in the basic BoS game to 95% in the BoS game with one-way one-
communication.5
• Four years on, Cooper et al. (1993) also provide experimental evidence on th
of forward induction in BoS games with outside options. They report that “[t]ho
the presence of the outside option changes play, [they] find only limited suppo
the forward-induction hypothesis” (p. 1303). However, the frequency of equilib
play (conditional on reaching the BoS subgame) rises from 41 to 90% whereas t
quency of the row player’s preferred equilibrium (again, conditional on reachin
BoS subgame) rises from 19 to 90%.
• Regarding the third approach mentioned above, the experimental literature ha
silent up to now. In this study we want to complement the experimental eviden
implementing the possibility of money burning.
To obtain a benchmark, we ran sessions on the standard BoS game as shown in
To assess how the potential of burning money affects behavior, we next ran session
extended game shown in Table 2. To learn more about the forces driving behavior, w
conducted sessions on the normal form representation of this game (see below, T
Note that deleting iteratively weakly dominated strategies in the normal form game le
the same prediction as the forward induction argument in the sequential game. Fina
conduct two additional control treatments with a game tree identical to the extended
from Table 2 but payoffs chosen such that forward induction does not select an equili
Our results concerning the simple BoS game replicate those reported earlie
by Cooper et al., 1989): Play is reasonably well predicted by the symmetric m
equilibrium. Regarding the behavior in the sequential money burning game we fin
the option to burn money significantly changes play in the BoS subgame—to rough
same extent as Cooper et al. (1989) report for an outside option: The equilibrium pre
by the row player (who has the opportunity to burn money) emerges in 69% of all
in which the BoS subgame is reached. In contrast to these results, we find that the
almost no predictive power in the normal form representation of the money burning
The predicted outcome is played in only 6.5% of all cases. The reason for this seem
that subjects do not iteratively eliminate dominated strategies but stop after one ro
reasoning.6 This shows that the actual timing in the game is important for whether o
the opportunity to burn money conveys an advantage.
5 For the effects of pre-play communication on behavior in coordination games see, e.g., Cooper et al.
Clark et al. (2000), Charness (2000), and Burton et al. (1999).
6 A stunning failure of subjects to go through longer chains of reasonings is reported in a recent pa
Kübler and Weizsäcker (in press) on informational cascades. For further evidence on subjects’ depth of reasoning































d by theThe results of our additional control treatments highlight the role of sequential
in a surprising manner. There the first mover also gains a significant advantage al
forward induction does not predict such an advantage. This suggests the neces
making theoretical advances in understanding the role of physical timing and first-m
advantages.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the exper
design. The results of the experiments are reported in Section 3. Section 4 introduc
control treatments and discusses the literature on the role of physical timing in g
Section 5 concludes.
2. Experimental design and procedures
The experiments were computerized7 and conducted at the University of London
November 2000, July 2001, and March 2003. Subjects were students from various
Upon arrival in the lab, participants were assigned to a computer terminal and re
written instructions. After reading them, questions could be asked which were ans
privately.
We employ a design that is quite similar to the one used in Cooper et al. (1993).8 In all,
we ran five treatments. For each treatment we conducted five sessions and in each s
group of 10 subjects interacted repeatedly. Thus, altogether 250 subjects participate
experiment. Each session consisted of 30 rounds which was common knowledge
participants. Also, subjects knew that they would be randomly matched in pairs in
of the 30 rounds. The numbers given in the payoff tables were measured in a fic
currency unit called “Points”. The fixed exchange rate of £1 for 4 Points was comm
known. In addition to their earnings, subjects received a £5 show-up fee.
We proceed by describing the three treatments we initially set out with. After we
analyzed the data of these treatments, we decided to add two further control trea
Mimicking this process, we shall introduce the fourth and the fifth treatment in a sep
section further below.
In treatment BoS subjects played the standard BoS game as shown in Table 1.
treatment no labels were assigned to participants. The instructions simply used the
“you” and the “other participant”. In each round all subjects had to decide betwee
options (“Option 1” and “Option 2”). After one round’s play, subjects were informed a
the choice of the participant they were matched with and about their individual pay
well as their total payoff so far.
see the seminal work of Nagel (1995) or the more recent papers by Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) and We
(2003), as well as the literature cited therein.
7 We used the software tool kitz-Tree, developed by Fischbacher (1999).
8 Cooper et al. (1993) report results of five treatments: (i) BoS, the baseline treatment with the standar
of-the-sexes game; (ii) BoS-300, introducing an outside option that (according to forward induction) i
enough to select the first mover’s preferred outcome; (iii) BoS-300-N, the same as (ii) in normal form; (iv
100, the same as (ii) but with an outside option too low to select the first mover’s preferred outcome; (v) Bo
the standard BoS game where the row player moves first in physical time but her choice is not observe
column player.

























ent).In treatmentBurn subjects played the sequential money burning game where we lab
the two roles by “A” and “B”. Prior to each odd round subjects were randomly assig
to one of the roles. In even rounds the roles were reversed. Matching was random
round and these procedures were commonly known (for details, see the instruct
Appendix A). At the beginning of a round, anA had to decide whether to go “to the righ
or “to the left”. By doing so,A selected a table. One table corresponded to the pa
table of the standard BoS game, the other to the payoff table that results from b
money. Furthermore, subjects were instructed thatB would be informed aboutA’s decision
regarding the two tables and that afterwardsA andB had to decide simultaneously abo
their options in the relevant table. After each round, subjects were informed abo
choice of the participant they were matched with in the respective subgame. As in tre
BoS, subjects were also informed about their individual payoff and their total payoff s
In treatmentNorm subjects played the (reduced) normal form of the money bur
game. Role assignment (as a row or a column player) and matching was as above. S
decided simultaneously in their respective roles. Again, after completion of a r
subjects were informed about the choice of the participant they were matched wi
about their individual payoff as well as their total payoff so far. The corresponding 4
4 payoff table is shown in Table 3. Here, the first component of the row player’s str
indicates whether she burns money (Burn) or not (Not) and the second component indica
which action she takes afterwards. Similarly, the first entry in the column player’s str
indicates this player’s choice after the row player did not burn money and the second
refers to the choice after the row player did burn one payoff unit. (In the experimen
actions were simply labelled Row and Column 1, 2, 3, and 4.) The solution of this
can be obtained by iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies:((Not,P ), (Y,Y ))
is the only surviving strategy profile after 5 steps.9
Due to possible losses in treatments Burn and Norm, subjects in all three treatme
an initial endowment of 20 Points (the show-up fee mentioned above). The monetary
was determined by individual earnings in the 30 rounds (plus the initial endowm
Table 3
The normal-form representation of the money burning game
Column player
Y,Y Y,P P,Y P,P
Row Not, Y 0, 0 0, 0 1, 3 1, 3
player Not,P 3, 1 3, 1 0, 0 0, 0
Burn, Y −1, 0 0, 3 −1, 0 0, 3
Burn,P 2, 1 −1, 0 2, 1 −1, 0
9 Step 1: (Burn, Y ) is weakly dominated by(Not,P ) for the row player.Step 2: (Y,P ) is weakly dominated
by (Y,Y ) and(P,P ) is weakly dominated by(P,Y ) for the column player.Step 3: (Not, Y ) is strictly dominated
by (Burn,P ) for the row player.Step 4: (P,Y ) is weakly dominated by(Y,Y ) for the column player.Step 5:
(Burn,P ) is strictly dominated by(Not,P ) for the row player. As a result, the strategy vector((Not,P ), (Y,Y ))
is the only one surviving the deletion of iteratively dominated strategy.

















ipantsWhereas sessions in treatments BoS and Norm lasted about 30 minutes, a se
treatment Burn lasted approximately 45 minutes. Average earnings in treatment BoS
and Norm were £12. 40, £ 14. 52 and £12 58, respectively.
Summarizing the theoretical predictions, we formulate the following hypotheses:
Forward Induction Hypothesis. There will be a significant first-mover advantage
treatment Burn. Row players will typically choose not to burn money and(P,Y ) will
be the most frequently observed outcome.
Iterative Dominance Hypothesis. There will be a significant first-mover advantage
treatment Norm. The most frequently observed outcome will be ((Not,P ), (Y,Y )).
3. Experimental results
In the following we focus on experienced and settled-down behavior from the se
half, i.e., the last 16 rounds of the experiment.10 We take an even number of rounds sin
this gives us for each of the subjects an equal number of decisions in each of th
player roles. Furthermore, for all subsequent statistical tests we treat each session
independent observation.
Let us first consider treatment BoS. As mentioned above there is no reason to
subjects to coordinate on one of the asymmetric equilibria. In fact, as shown in Ta
strategyP was chosen in 65% of all cases which is not too far away from the mi
equilibrium frequency of 75%. Table 4 also shows the probability distribution ove
four cells of the payoff matrix as implied by the observed behavior.11 Each of the two
asymmetric equilibria are expected with a probability of 22.75%.
Cooper et al. (1993) who rely on an identical BoS game12 r port that strategyP was
chosen in 63.5% of all cases. Thus, our results are remarkably close to theirs.
Now consider the results of treatment Burn in which the row player has the oppor
to burn one payoff unit prior to the play of the simultaneous-move game. Recall that t
Table 4
Treatment BoS: Relative frequency of choices and outcomes in the last 16 periods
N = 400 Column player Total
Y P
Row Y 12.25 22.75 35.00
player P 22.75 42.25 65.00
10 While there are some significant time trends in the first half of the experiment, there are no sign
correlations between time and behavior in the last 16 rounds. Moreover, all our results regarding diff
between treatments are robust against selecting different subsets of periods.
11 Note that the actual distribution would give a slightly distorted picture as it depends on how partic
were matched with each other.12 In their experiments, however, all numbers were multiplied by 200.





















, row’s andTable 5
Treatment Burn: Absolute and relative (in parentheses) frequencies of outcomes in the last 16 period
Left (right) panel after the row player’s decision not to burn (to burn) money
N = 375 Column player Total
(93.8) Y P
Row Y 30 11 40
player (8.0) (2.9) (10.9)
P 258 76 334
(68.8) (20.3) (89.1)
Total 288 87 375
(76.8) (23.2) (100)
N = 25 Column player Total
(6.2) Y P
Row Y 2 3 5
player (8.0) (12.0) (20.0)
P 37 7 20
(52.0) (28.0) (80.0)
Total 15 10 25
(60.0) (40.0) (100)
predicts the row player to choosenot to burn and subsequent coordination on the
player’s preferred equilibrium. Inspecting Table 5, which summarizes the data, we ob
that in 93.8% of all cases row players indeed choose not to burn money. Next, we ob
that the incidence of the row player’s preferred equilibrium rises from 22.75% in trea
BoS to 68.8% in treatment Burn. This increase is statistically significant atp = 0.005 (one-
tailed Mann–Whitney U-test based on five observations per treatment). Neverthele
is still a smaller change than predicted by theory. Row players now playP in 89.1% of
all cases (compared to 65% in BoS) and column players’ relative frequency ofY increases
from 35 to 76.8%.
Let us next compare earnings in treatments BoS and Burn. Subjects in treatme
earn on average 0.92 Points (standard deviation based on session means 0.12). In
in treatment Burn row players earn on average 2.00 Points (std. dev. 0.54). Acc
to a one-tailed Mann–Whitney U-test this is a significant increase vis-à-vis sub
earnings in treatment BoS (p = 0.004). Column players’ average earnings, however, a
0.78 (std. dev. 0.07) significantly lower than average earnings in the baseline tre
BoS (p = 0.028). Finally, a one-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs test reveals that
players’ earnings in treatment Burn are significantly higher than column players’ ea
(p = 0.0215).13
We summarize what we found so far by stating
Result 1. There is support for the Forward Induction Hypothesis. Players signific
benefit from having the option to burn money.
Let us now turn to treatment Norm. Recall that according to the Iterative Domin
Hypothesis, we expect behavior to converge to ((Not,P ), (Y,Y )). But inspection of
Table 6, which shows data from the normal form treatment, reveals that the hypo
is dramatically falsified: Play coincides with the predicted outcome in only 6.5% o
cases.
Regarding the behavior of the row player we notice that—taken together—the (im
decision not to burn money accounts for 94.5% of all cases which is close to the 9
13 Again, the test is based on session averages; i.e., each session serves as one observation for both
column’s earnings.






















Treatment Norm: Absolute and relative (in parentheses) frequencies of outcomes in the last 16 periods
N = 160 Column player Total
Y,Y Y,P P,Y P,P
Row Not, Y 4 21 5 21 51
player (1.0) (5.3) (1.3) (5.3) (12.8)
Not,P 26 170 40 91 327
(6.5) (42.5) (10.0) (22.8) (81.8)
Burn, Y – 2 1 1 4
(–) (0.5) (0.3) (0.3) (1.0)
Burn,P 3 8 2 5 18
(0.8) (2.0) (0.5) (1.3) (4.5)
Total 33 201 48 118 400
(8.3) (50.3) (12.0) (29.5) (100)
in treatment Burn. Furthermore, strategy(Not,P ) which is the row player’s part of th
predicted outcome was chosen in 81.8% of all cases (which compares to 83.6% in B14).
As subjects fail to go through the whole process of iterative elimination of we
dominated strategies, it seems worthwhile to check how far they actually got. They
to master the first step: The strategy that is deleted in the first round,(Burn, Y ) of the
row player, is almost never chosen (1%). After the elimination of(Burn, Y ), the column
player’s strategies(Y,P ) and(P,P ) become dominated. So, if subjects manage to rea
two steps, they should be played rarely. However, they are chosen in 79.8% of all
This is a clear failure of rationality, especially as subjects constantly switch roles and
both sides of the game.
Note, however, that the row player’s strategy(Burn,P ) that makes(Y,P ) for the
column player worse than(Y,Y ) and(P,P ) worse than(P,Y ) is also very rarely chosen
namely in only 4.5% of all cases.15 Cooper et al. (1993) observed a similar failure of
iterative-deletion argument. In their treatment as well as in ours, the iterative delet
dominated strategies stops after the first round.16
Recall that subjects in treatment BoS earned on average 0.92 Points. In treatmen
however, row players earn on average 1.52 Points (std. dev. 0.60) which appears to
to the high frequency (42.5%) of the outcome ((Not,P ), (Y,P )) which gives the sam
payoffs as the strategy vector that survives the iterative deletion of weakly dom
strategies. Column players in treatment Norm earn on average 0.72 Points (std. dev
While the increase in row players’ earnings is only significant atp = 0.076 (one-tailed
14 Note that in treatment Burn the row player first chooses the subgame and then an action in this s
whereas in treatment Norm these two choices are made simultaneously. In order to make the tw
comparable, in treatment Burn we multiply the frequency with which row players choseP in the BoS subgame
89.1%, with the relative frequency with which the BoS subgame was selected, 93.8%. Hence the
83.6%= (89.1× 93.8)/100%.
15 This is what evolutionary game theory would suggest: Weakly dominated strategies can survive
strategies against which they are doing badly disappear. See, for example, Nachbar (1990) and Samuelso16 Similar findings are also reported in other studies (see footnote 6).




















Treatment Norm, Alternative representation: Absolute and relative (in parentheses) frequencies o
outcomes in the last 16 periods. Left (right) panel after the row player’s decision not to burn (to burn)
money
N = 378 Column player Total
(94.5) Y P
Row Y 25 26 51
player (6.6) (6.9) (13.5)
P 196 131 327
(51.9) (34.7) (86.5)
Total 221 157 378
(58.5) (41.5) (100)
N = 22 Column player Total
(5.5) Y P
Row Y 1 3 4
player (4.5) (13.6) (18.2)
P 5 13 18
(22.7) (59.1) (81.8)
Total 6 16 22
(27.3) (72.7) (100)
Mann–Whitney U-test), the decrease in column players’ earnings is highly signi
(p = 0.004).
For the sake of comparison with the results in treatment Burn, Table 7 show
alternative representation of the results in treatment Norm. Here the results are pre
as if subjects had played the sequential game. Comparing the results of the left subg
Tables 5 and 7, it is apparent that the row players’ behavior is very similar whereas c
players yield less often in treatment Norm. In any case, we can summarize by statin
Result 2. There is no support for the Iterative Dominance Hypothesis. However,
players weakly benefit from having the option to burn money.
What we found so far is that there is some support for the Forward Induction Hypo
as the option to burn money drives behavior in treatment Burn into the direction pre
by this theory. However, iterated deletion of dominated strategies fails dramatically
normal form game. These differences concerning play in the extensive and the norm
representation suggests that the fact of giving only one of the players the opportu
burn money in treatment Burn might have created a focal asymmetry favoring th
player. To assess the explanatory power of this hypothesis, we conducted two c
treatments in which forward induction is not an issue. These are described in the foll
section.
4. Two control treatments
4.1. Design and predictions
The games used in our two control treatments are shown in Tables 8 and 9. I
games forward induction has no bite.17
17 This is obvious in the case of the second game shown in Table 9. Here the first choice is materially irr
since both subgames are identical. To see that forward induction has no bite in the first game in Table 8,
that the payoff in the mixed strategy equilibrium is identical in both subgames.























The game in treatment Control I
Game to be played after the row player’s
decision to go “Left”
Column player
Y P
Row Y 0, 0 1, 3
player P 3, 1 0, 0
Game to be played after the row player’s
decision to go “Right”
Column player
Y P
Row Y 0, 0 1.2, 2
player P 2, 1.2 0, 0
Table 9
The game in treatment Control II
Game to be played after the row player’s
decision to go “Left”
Column player
Y P
Row Y 0, 0 1, 3
player P 3, 1 0, 0
Game to be played after the row player’s
decision to go “Right”
Column player
Y P
Row Y 0, 0 3, 1
player P 1, 3 0, 0
The games are designed to assess the relevance of two behavioral explanations
first movers may have an advantage in the main treatment Burn. The first expla
(which has been suggested by a referee) is a variant of the standard forward ind
argument which we shall callbehavioral forward induction. The idea is that subjec
do use forward induction but ignore mixed strategies.18 Consider the game in our firs
control treatment, shown in Table 8 and assume that subjects only consider payo
correspond to pure-strategy equilibria. Then subjects in the control treatment may
that by choosing left a row player could either hope to earn 1 or 3, whereas by cho
right she could earn 1.2 or 2. Therefore, a subject acting as a row player and ch
left might signal that she will go for the payoff of 3 since the alternative equilibr
gives a payoff that is lower than both equilibrium payoffs in the right subgame. Obvio
this version of behavioral forward induction also works in the original game of treat
Burn.19 However, it does not work in the second control treatment where the row pla
initial choice is basically irrelevant since both subgames are materially identical (only
and columns have been switched).
While behavioral forward induction predicts a first-mover advantage in the first bu
the second control treatment, the alternative behavioral explanation predicts first-
advantages in both settings. This explanation is based on the idea that the fact t
18 Recall that the forward induction argument in the money burning game of Table 2 rests on the fact
row player’s expected payoff in the BoS subgame cannot drop below 3/4. This payoff is equal to the row player
maximin payoff and the row player’s payoff in the mixed equilibrium.
19 One can argue that “behavioral forward induction” works better in the control treatment than in trea
Burn where it requires subjects to think one level deeper. In Burn subjects have to figure out that by not
money the row player signals that she wants a payoff of at least 2, the payoff that she could obtain by
money.






























itionalplayer can make a first choice renders this player’s preferences “focal” (even if the c
is materially irrelevant). This alternative focal-point explanation is related to the effec
what Rapoport and collaborators called “positional order protocol”.20 Under a positiona
order protocol players choose sequentially in physical time although information
previous choices is not revealed. Game theoretically such sequences are equiv
simultaneous decision making.21 Behaviorally, however, there is evidence for a substan
and significant advantage in moving first even if information about choices is not p
on. In fact, Cooper et al. (1993) were the first to conduct such a positional-order-pr
experiment with the two-player BoS game and the preferred equilibrium of the playe
moved first in physical time emerged in 62% of all cases.22 Similar results are presente
in Muller and Sadanand (2001). A first-mover advantage in our second control trea
would prove an even stronger impact of physical sequences in playing games. Af
when subjects reach one of the two subgames perfect symmetry between the pla
restored. This is different under a positional-order-protocol where the game theo
symmetry is broken by physical time. In our experiment it would be an eventin the past
that breaks symmetry in the present. Thus, a first-mover advantage in our second
treatment would stress the importance of incorporating physical time into a game the
framework.
We summarize the predictions for the control treatments in the following three dive
hypotheses:
Forward Induction Hypothesis 2. There will be no first-mover advantage in both cont
treatments.
Behavioral Forward Induction Hypothesis. There will be a significant first-move
advantage in the first but not the second control treatment.
Physical Timing Hypothesis. There will be a significant first-mover advantage in b
control treatments.
20 See Rapoport (1997) and Güth et al. (1998), as well as the references cited in both.
21 von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) distinguish between “anteriority” (chronological order of pla
“preliminarity” (priority in information). They note that both coincide if and only if the extensive form ga
has perfect information. A more formal approach to this idea is due to Thompson (1952) who form
transformations that preserve the reduced normal form of an extensive game, e.g., the interchange o
principle.
22 We decided not to run such a treatment for two reasons: First, as mentioned in footnote 12, the Bo
used by Cooper et al. (1993) corresponds to ours except that their payoffs are ours multiplied by 200. Th
is no reason to expect that we would observe different behavior and, therefore, add any new insight. Se
believe that a treatment better suited to shed additional light on the behavior of subjects in our experimen
in which we keep the basic structure of the money-burning game, i.e., the row player has a “first choice”
thesimultaneous play of a subgame. Note again that in the treatment in Cooper et al. (1993) using the pos
order protocol, players in the BoS (subgame) movesequentially.

















We conducted five sessions for each of the two control treatments. In each sessio
a group of 10 subjects interacted repeatedly. Apart from the different payoffs in the
subgame, everything else was exactly the same as in treatment Burn. The results of
control treatment are presented in Table 10, the results of the second in Table 11.
Inspection of Table 10 showing the results of treatmentControl I reveals the following
facts. First, the original BoS subgame is chosen much more often than the alternativ
subgame (in 89% of all cases which compares to 93.8% in treatment Burn). Seco
incidence of the row player’s preferred equilibrium rises from 22.75% in treatment
to 82.9% in the control treatment which is highly significant.23 It appears that this effec
is even more pronounced than the one observed in treatment Burn where the row
gets his preferred equilibrium only in 68.8% of all instances of the BoS subgame
turns out that the difference between Burn and the first control treatment is not statis
significant.
Next, let us examine Table 11 that shows the results of treatmentControl II. Here we do
not expect that one subgame is chose more often than the other (after all they are v
identical). The data are close to fifty–fifty with the left subgame being chosen in rou
Table 10
Treatment Control I: Absolute and relative (in parentheses) frequencies of outcomes in the last 16 per
N = 356 Column player Total
(89.0) Y P
Row Y 12 2 14
player (3.4) (0.6) (3.9)
P 295 47 342
(82.9) (13.2) (96.1)
Total 307 49 356
(86.2) (13.8) (100)
N = 44 Column player Total
(11.0) Y P
Row Y 10 3 13
player (22.7) (6.8) (29.5)
P 16 15 31
(36.4) (34.1) (70.5)
Total 26 18 44
(59.1) (40.9) (100)
Table 11
Treatment Control II: Absolute and relative (in parentheses) frequencies of outcomes in the last 16 pe
N = 227 Column player Total
(56.8) Y P
Row Y 10 7 17
player (4.4) (3.1) (7.5)
P 133 77 210
(58.6) (33.9) (92.5)
Total 143 84 227
(63.0) (37.0) (100)
N = 173 Column player Total
(43.2) Y P
Row Y 55 92 147
player (31.8) (53.2) (85.0)
P 9 17 26
(5.2) (9.8) (15.0)
Total 64 109 173
(37.0) (63.0) (100)
23 The increase is significant atp = 0.004 (one-tailed MWU test). Note that row players in the BoS subg
playP in 96.1% of all cases (compared to 65% in treatment BoS). Column players’ relative frequency ofY rises
from 35% (in treatment BoS) to 86.3%. As one-tailed MWU tests indicate, the changes in both row and
players’ behavior is significant atp = 0.004.





























ioned57% of all cases.24 However, despite the first choice being materially irrelevant, we obs
that the incidence of the row player’s preferred equilibrium rises from 22.75% in trea
BoS to 58.6% in the left subgame and to 53.2% in the right subgame! Both increas
statistically significant.25 Comparing the second control treatment with Burn we find
first movers did slightly better in the latter where they got their preferred equilibriu
68.8% cases conditional on reaching the BoS subgame. However, MWU tests reve
the differences between the occurrence of the row player’s preferred outcome cond
on reaching the BoS subgame in treatment Burn and conditional on reaching th
subgames of the second control treatment are statistically insignificant.26
We, therefore, conclude with
Result 3. The data reject both the Forward Induction and the Behavioral Forward Indu
Hypothesis but lend significant support to the Physical Timing Hypothesis.
5. Toward a unified theory of physical time in games
The data reported here present strong evidence for the relevance of physical
games. In some sense the evidence is even stronger than previous evidence f
analysis of the so-called positional order protocol. There, letting players move seque
in physical time without information revelation induces a strong first-mover advan
as first shown by Cooper et al. (1993). Theoretical attempts to make sense out o
results go back to Amershi et al.’s (1989a, 1989b, 1989c) “manipulated Nash equilibr
In essence, Amershi et al. refine Nash equilibrium by introducing the notion of “vi
observability”: If players move sequentially in physical time, they analyze the exte
form of a game with the same game tree but perfect information. If this new game
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome that is preferred by the first mover and that coi
with an equilibrium outcome of the original game, players play according to it. If
physical timing is irrelevant (see also Weber et al., 2004).27
However, in our second control treatment “virtual observability” doesnot predict a first
mover advantage. After all, players do move simultaneously in both subgames. Hen
results show that the effect of physical timing goes beyond that of “virtual observab
Rather it seems that players use any clue that is provided by the physical sequenc
play in order to select among multiple equilibria. Hence, even (irrelevant) decisions
past can render one player’s preferred outcome “focal”. The data also show which pl
It is always the first mover who has an advantage.
All of this is in line with simple yet widespread social norms like first-come-first-se
Why such norms have arisen is, of course, an issue we cannot address with ou
24 This slight tendency to prefer the left subgame over the right subgame is probably due to some cultur
and should probably not be a source of concern.
25 A one-tailed MWU test deliversp = 0.004 for the left subgame andp = 0.0755 for the right subgame.
26 A two-tailed MWU tests deliversp = 0.421 for the left subgame andp = 0.310 for the right subgame.
27 Note that “virtual observability” selects the first mover’s preferred equilibrium in the above-mentpositional-order-protocol experiment by Cooper et al. (1993).
































ndts andNevertheless, we can speculate a little. First-come-first-serve is a simple yet often e
rule. In particular, it is much more attractive than the opposite rule which prefers
comers. So it might not be that surprising that first-come-first-serve has evolved as a
norm or is used as an explicit allocation mechanism (e.g., for concert ticket sales
once it has evolved it might be quite natural to “use” it for new problems even if they a
a slightly different nature. In particular, players in the above games might reason tha
is a solution totheir conflict that is often used to resolve other, somewhat similar confl
Whoever is first, gets what he wants. A theoretical model of this argument would re
formal notions of similarities between problems and rules. Equipped with such no
one could study how a social norm that has evolved for a particular class of problem
cause “spillovers” to other classes. With such spillovers the role of time in one gam
crucially depend on its role in another, different game. The evidence we have seen
suggests that this might indeed be the case.
6. Summary and discussion
In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to assess the beh
impact of giving one player the opportunity to burn money prior to the play of a ba
of-the-sexes game. By using forward induction arguments or, alternatively, delet
iteratively dominated strategies, theory predicts that this variation of the BoS
completely solves the coordination problem. In fact, we find that the option to burn m
changes play in the BoS subgame; yet not quite to the extent theory predicts. Furthe
as in several other studies,28 we find dramatic differences concerning the play in
extensive and the normal form representation suggesting that having one of the
moving before the other creates a “pseudo” first-mover advantage. This explanation
strong support in two control treatments where a game theoretically irrelevant c
between two subgames still induced a massive advantage for the player who had t
this first choice. The results of the control treatments are related to previous experi
data showing that physical timing can be of utter importance even if game theory pr
it to be irrelevant. In our view, this suggests that further theoretical work to incorp
physical time into game theory could become very fruitful indeed.
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Appendix A. Instructions
A.1. Instructions of treatment BoS
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully! Do not speak to your neighb
keep quiet during the entire experiment! In case you have a question raise your hand! We will then come
In this experiment you will repeatedly make decisions. Doing this you can earn money. How muc
earn depends on your decisions and on the decisions of other participants. All participants receive t
instructions.
All participants stay anonymous to the experimenter and also to other participants.
In the experimental situation there are two agents. In each round every participant will be randomly m
with another one. Both participants have to decide simultaneously what to do. In particular, you each
either “Option 1” or “Option 2”.
Table A.1 is read as follows. The head of a row shows the possible options you have yourself (“Op
and “Option 2”). The head of a column shows the identical options of the other participant (also “Option
“Option 2”). For a given combination of decisions, the left number in the box at which row and column int
is your own payoff and the right number the payoff for the other participant. The payoffs are given in Poin
sum of your individual earnings in the 30 rounds (plus your endowment) determines your monetary pa
Pounds. After the experiment is finished you will get £1 for every 4 Points that you have earned.
The experiment consists of 30 rounds. In each round you will be randomly matched with one of th
participants. (You do not know with whom you are matched.) Notice that this means that it is not very like
you will be matched with the same person in two consecutive rounds.
At the start of the experiment you get a one-off endowment of 20 Points. (This is the £5 show-up fee yo
promised, see below.)
The sum of your individual earnings in the 30 rounds (plus your endowment) determines your mo
payoff in Pounds. After the experiment is finished you will get £1 for every 4 Points that you have.
A.2. Instructions of treatment Burn/Norm
[In both treatments:] Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully! Do not s
your neighbors and keep quiet during the entire experiment! In case you have a question raise your hand
then come to you.
In this experiment you will repeatedly make decisions. Doing this you can earn money. How muc
earn depends on your decisions and on the decisions of other participants. All participants receive t
instructions.
All participants stay anonymous to the experimenter and also to other participants.
[Next only for treatment Burn:] In the experimental situation there are two agents calledA an B , respectively
(see Table A.2). In each round everyA will be randomly matched with aB . At the beginning of a round,A has
to decide whether he wants to go “to the right” or “to the left”. If he chooses Left then Table L will be releva
he chooses Right, Table R will be relevant.
Table A.1
Other choice
Option 1 Option 2
Your Option 1 0, 0 1, 3
choice Option 2 3, 1 0, 0










Column 1 Column 2
Row 1 0, 0 1, 3
Row 2 3, 1 0, 0
Table R
Column 1 Column 2
Row 1 −1, 0 0, 3
Row 2 2, 1 −1, 0
Table A.3
Participant B
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
ParticipantA Row 1 0, 0 0, 0 1, 3 1, 3
Row 2 3, 1 3, 1 0, 0 0, 0
Row 3 −1, 0 0, 3 −1, 0 0, 3
Row 4 2, 1 −1, 0 2, 1 −1, 0
B will be informed aboutA’s decision regarding which table has been chosen. After thatA ndB have to
decide simultaneously about their options in the relevant table. AgentA has to choose either “Row 1” or “Row 2”
agentB has to choose either “Column 1” or “Column 2”.
The tables are read as follows: The head of a row shows the possible options of agentA (“Row 1” or “Row 2”)
and the head of a column shows the possible options of agentB (“Column 1” or “Column 2”). For a given
combination of decisions, the left number in the box at which row and column intersect is the payoff ofA and the
right number the one forB . The payoffs are given in Points.
[Next only for treatment Norm:] In the experimental situation there are two agents calledA and B ,
respectively (see Table A.3). In each round everyA will be randomly matched with aB . A and B have to
decide simultaneously about their options in the table. AgentA has to choose one of the four rows (“Row 1”,. . . ,
“Row 4”), agentB has to choose one of the four columns (“Column 1”,. . . , “Column 4”).
The tables are read as follows. The head of a row shows the possible options of agentA (“Row 1” to “Row 4”)
and the head of a column shows the possible options of agentB (“Column 1” to “Column 4”). For a given
combination of decisions, the left number in the box at which row and column intersect is the payoff ofA and the
right number the one forB . The payoffs are given in Points.
[In both treatments:] The experiment consists of 30 rounds.
For the role assignment and matching procedure the following holds:
(1) In each round you will be matched with another person chosen at random. (You do not know with
you are matched.)
(2) In each pair of consecutive rounds(1,2), (3,4), . . . and so on you will be agentA once and agentB once.
It will be randomly determined which role you will have in which round. In any case, in the course o
experiment you will be as often in the role ofA as you will be in the role ofB . (Notice that—becaus
of point 1—it is not very likely that you will be matched with the same other participant during thes
rounds.)
(3) In each round anA-participant will always be matched with aB-participant and vice versa. At the start
the experiment you get a one-off endowment of 20 Points. (This is the £5 show-up fee you were pro
The sum of your individual earnings in the 30 rounds (plus your endowment) determines your monetary
in Pounds. After the experiment is finished you will get £1 for every 4 Points that you have.
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